

SAYING, BUT NOT DOING: INDUCED HYPOCRISY, TRIVIALIZATION, AND MISATTRIBUTION

VALÉRIE FOINTIAT

Université Paul Verlaine-Metz, France

ALAIN SOMAT AND JEAN-MICHEL GROSBRAS

Université Rennes II, France

Hypocrisy paradigm has been identified as a form of dissonance induction. Hypocrisy is induced by the combination of 2 factors: commitment (advocating a position one supports) and mindfulness (being made mindful of one's failure to act in accord with the advocated standards). The experimental 2 x 2 between participants design manipulates misattribution and the order of presentation of 2 modes of dissonance reduction, behavior change – which is the paradigmatic measure of hypocrisy reduction – versus trivialization – which consists of minimizing the importance of what was done. Misattribution effect is observed for any given mode of reduction so long as it is made available first. Furthermore, the misattribution effect no longer occurs when considering the mode of reduction is made available second. These results suggest that misattribution is not a permanent and efficient route of dissonance reduction, and support the perspective of a complementary model of dissonance reduction.

Keywords: induced hypocrisy, misattribution, behavior change, trivialization, cognitive dissonance, compliance.

After a few dark years, cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is enjoying a resurgence of interest (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; McKimmie et al., 2003; Stone & Cooper, 2001). According to Festinger (1957) the inconsistency between two cognitions (for instance, an attitude and a counterattitudinal behavior) arouses an aversive psychological state – called dissonance – which in turn motivates activities designed to reduce this arousal.

Valérie Fointiat, Université Paul Verlaine-Metz, France; Alain Somat and Jean-Michel Grosbras, Université Rennes II, France.

Appreciation is due to anonymous reviewers.

Please address correspondence and reprint requests to: Valérie Fointiat, Université Paul Verlaine-Metz, InterPsy/ETIC UFR Sciences Humaines et Arts, Ile du Saulcy, BP 30309 F-57006 Metz cedex 01, France. Email: valerie.fointiat@univ-metz.fr

Initially, Festinger (1957) described three basic modes of dissonance reduction: modifying one or more dissonant elements; adding new consistent elements; and minimizing the importance of one or more dissonant elements. The first mode refers to attitude change, which appears, based on dissonance literature, to be the most studied mode of reduction. The third refers to the trivialization process, which was mentioned by Festinger (1957), but remained unexplored until Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm investigated it in 1995. *Trivialization* has been defined as *the minimization of the importance of the elements involved in the dissonant relationships*. It has been shown to be an alternate mode of dissonance reduction (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006; Martinie, 2003; Martinie & Joule, 2000; Michel & Fointiat, 2002; Simon et al., 1995).

This resurgence is also discernible through the emergence of new paradigms: double-forced compliance (Beauvois & Joule, 1999; Joule, 1991) and induced hypocrisy (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991). The former refers to an extension of the basic forced-compliance paradigm (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). The latter was presented at the beginning of the 1990s, and combines two steps: commitment and mindfulness. *Commitment* consists of *advocating the importance of behaving in conducting a prosocial manner*, e.g., practicing safe sex to prevent acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) (Aronson et al., 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994); and promoting water conservation (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 1992); recycling to preserve natural resources (Fried & Aronson, 1995); and promoting road safety (Fointiat, 2004). The commitment factor has been operationalized in many ways: videotaping proattitudinal speeches, proattitudinal advocacies, petitions, and so on. *Mindfulness* consists of *making the individual aware of instances when he/she did not behave in line with the advocated standards*. Transgressions are made salient by asking participants to spend a few minutes thinking about their past failures, or by asking them to complete a questionnaire in which each item is a plausible illustration of their own transgressions. The discrepancy between the prosocial advocacy and the past transgressions arouses dissonance. An individual is motivated to reduce this psychological discomfort by modifying his/her subsequent behaviors into line with the prior advocacy. In other words “practicing what was preached would reduce dissonance without changing the perception of what constitutes appropriate and reasonable behavior” (Stone, Wiegard, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997).

EXPERIMENTAL ILLUSTRATIONS

A set of three experiments constitutes the core of the hypocritical procedure (Aronson et al., 1991; Dickerson et al., 1992; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1994). They share the same between subjects experimental design: 2 (public commitment: proattitudinal speech versus no speech) x 2 (mindfulness: salience

of past transgressions versus no salience). Only one of these four experimental conditions should lead to a hypocritical effect (i.e., behavior change): the condition that combines commitment and mindfulness.

For example, Aronson et al. (1991) and Stone et al. (1994) induced in participants a feeling of hypocrisy about their condom use. In the crucial hypocrisy condition, participants videotaped speeches advocating the systematic use of condoms (commitment factor). After this advocacy, they were asked to list times in their own past when they had failed to practice safe sex (mindfulness factor). The induction of hypocrisy in the Dickerson et al. (1992) experiment was quite different. Participants were recruited at a university swimming pool. In the paradigmatic condition they were led to sign a flyer promoting water conservation (commitment factor); afterwards, they were led to complete a questionnaire in which each question illustrated a wasting behavior (mindfulness factor).

In these three basic experiments, dissonance was predicted in the condition combining the commitment and the mindfulness factors. Conversely, dissonance was not predicted in the conditions in which one of the factors (commitment or mindfulness) was absent. The results supported this prediction. Participants in the hypocrisy conditions showed not only an increase in their intention to use condoms (Aronson et al., 1991), but actually bought more condoms (Stone et al., 1994), than did participants in the other three experimental conditions. Similarly, hypocritical participants took shorter showers than did control participants (Dickerson et al., 1992).

INTERPRETATION OF HYPOCRISY

Self-consistency (Aronson, 1968; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992) provides the most current interpretation of hypocrisy effect (i.e., behavioral change). According to this interpretation of dissonance, individuals generally strive to maintain a sense of self that is both consistent and positive (Aronson, 1999). In other words, making salient the inconsistency between what people have preached (prosocial speech) and their own past transgressions (Stone et al., 1997) threatens the self-concept. The aim of the reduction process is to restore the global self-image rather than a specific dimension of self (as supported by self-affirmation theorists, Stone et al.). The easier way to do so is to engage in subsequent prosocial behaviors. Hence, modifying his/her future behavior or behavioral intentions enables the restoration of an individual's self-concept as a moral, rational, and competent person.

Even if the self-consistency interpretation can account for the experimental data, how can it be ascertained that dissonance is involved in these experiments (Aronson, 1999)? Fried and Aronson (1995) considered alternative theoretical interpretations in terms of priming, the additive effect of influence, the accessibility of positive attitude, or "face saving". In order to distinguish between these in-

terpretations, the authors have called on the misattribution paradigm (Zanna & Cooper, 1976)¹. All participants videotaped speeches advocating the importance of recycling (commitment factor). Afterwards the participants listed times when they had failed to recycle (mindfulness factor). Half of the participants were given the opportunity to misattribute their arousal via a questionnaire concerning environmental factors within the laboratory (misattribution condition). As expected, the hypocritical participants who were not given the opportunity to misattribute their arousal to external cues were significantly more inclined to change their behavior than were the hypocritical participants in the misattribution context. Consequently, Fried and Aronson concluded that misattribution is an efficient route of dissonance reduction.

From the dissonance theorists' point of view (Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1997), misattribution is considered as a mode of dissonance reduction, and more specifically as an indirect mode (i.e., involving activities that reduce dissonance without altering elements of discrepancy). This assumption is frequent throughout dissonance literature. Nevertheless, some dissonance theorists do not share this point of view (Fointiat, 1996; Stults, Messé, & Kerr, 1984): the lack of dissonance effect (i.e., no attitude change) cannot be assimilated to the lack of dissonance state. In other words, misattribution could inhibit attitude change, but at the same time the aversive psychological state would remain (i.e., dissonance).

To test these assumptions, we varied the order of presentation of two modes of dissonance reduction: behavior change (e.g., the usual mode of dissonance reduction in hypocrisy experiments) and trivialization (Simon et al., 1995).

In our research we strove to meet two targets. First, in line with Fried and Aronson's (1995) results, hypocritical effect (e.g., behavioral change) was expected to occur solely in the no misattribution context. Second, if misattribution is an efficient mode of dissonance reduction (as Fried and Aronson advocated), participants will not be motivated to use an alternate mode of reduction (e.g., trivialization or behavioral change). Based on previous studies (Fointiat, 1996; Stults et al., 1984), we assumed that misattribution would not be an efficient mode of dissonance reduction. Thus, dissonance would not be reduced, leading participants to use the mode of reduction made available second (main hypothesis).

¹ The misattribution paradigm was basically applied in forced compliance situations. In such situations, when participants were given the opportunity to misattribute their internal arousal (i.e., dissonance state) to an external cue (i.e., misattribution cue: noise, fluorescent lamps, placebo, bogus pipeline, war, or erotic photographs), no attitude change occurred, this is the so-called misattribution effect.

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Eighty students (women aged between 19 and 25) in the Department of Human Sciences at the University of Poitiers in France took part in the experiment; all of them had a driving license. They were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (context: misattribution versus no misattribution) x 2 (order: trivialization-first versus behavior change-first) between participants factorial design.

PRETEST

In an independent pretest, 20 male and female students from the Department of Human Sciences were asked to volunteer to work in a nonprofit road safety organization. The results of the pretest indicate that the response to this request was poor: only 3 out of 20 offered their services.

PROCEDURE

Overview The experimenter presented himself as a member of a road safety association on the campus. All participants were presented with a situation in which they could only be hypocritical: they were first led to compose an essay advocating the respect of speed limits (commitment factor). As soon as the essay was written, the experimenter thanked the participants and asked them to respond to questions concerning speed limitations (mindfulness factor). The aim of the questionnaire was to make the participants aware of their own transgressions (Stone et al., 1997). Participants had to describe accurately for each transgression recalled, the circumstances of the violation (Fointiat, Morisot, & Pakuszewski, 2008). After responding to the questionnaire, the dependent measures were administered (trivialization-first versus behavior change-first).

Order of the mode of reduction manipulation In the trivialization-first condition, participants were asked to respond to a set of four items measuring trivialization. After responding to the questionnaire on trivialization, the experimenter presented the behavioral request (volunteering to work in a road safety association).

In the behavior change-first condition, the experimenter asked participants to volunteer for a campus road safety association (behavioral request). After agreeing to, or rejecting, this request, participants completed the trivialization questionnaire.

Misattribution manipulation Half of the participants in each condition performed the experiment in an overlit, small experimental box (misattribution condition). The other half participated in a normal room (no misattribution condition).

Dependent measures The trivialization questionnaire was adapted² from a study by Simon et al. (1995). A sample item is: "How important is the issue of speed?" These questions were answered on an 11-point scale ranging from 1 = *extremely important* to 11 = *not at all important*. As Cronbach's alpha was reasonable ($\alpha = .66$), an index of trivialization was constructed.

The behavior change measure was assessed by asking participants to volunteer to work for a road safety association: to improve their commitment, they had to note their private address and phone number on a separate sheet of paper, mentioning the name and the address of the association. It was specified that the association would phone them soon.

Debriefing Participants were debriefed three weeks later, by phone.

RESULTS

TABLE 1
PARTICIPANTS IN EACH CONDITION WHO AGREED TO VOLUNTEER TO WORK IN A ROAD SAFETY ASSOCIATION, AND SCORE OF TRIVIALIZATION

	Sample size	% volunteering (behavior-change)	Trivialization score*
No misattribution			
Behavior change-first	20	75 (15/20)	6.60
Trivialization-first	20	20 (4/20)	9.85
Misattribution			
Behavior change-first	20	30 (6/20)	10.85
Trivialization-first	20	55 (11/20)	7.10

Note: * the higher the score, the higher the trivialization.

BEHAVIOR CHANGE

A log-linear analysis was conducted on the behavior change measures, in which the dependent variable was coded 1 (commitment to volunteer) and 0 (no commitment to volunteer).

There was no effect of either misattribution or order on behavior change (respectively, chi-square (2) = .97, *ns*; chi-square (2) = 2.53, *ns*). The interaction of these two variables was statistically significant (chi-square (4) = 14.85, $p = .005$).

² Since the original trivialization scale was used in the forced compliance paradigm and specifically in the counterattitudinal advocacy paradigm, the items used in our study were adapted.

Case to case comparisons measuring the effect of misattribution in the behavior change-first conditions showed that participants in the no misattribution context were more willing to volunteer than were participants in the misattribution context (respectively 15/20 and 6/20, chi-square (1) = 8.12, $p = .004$). In accordance with Fried and Aronson's (1995) findings, hypocritical effect occurs in a standard context (i.e., no misattribution context).

Conversely, in the trivialization-first conditions, participants in the no misattribution condition were less inclined to volunteer (4/20) than were participants in the misattribution condition (11/20, chi-square (1) = 3.84, $p = .05$).

Partial comparisons measuring the effect of order in the no misattribution condition, revealed that participants in the behavior change-first condition (15/20) were more inclined to volunteer than were those in the trivialization-first condition (4/20, chi-square (Yates correction, 1) = 10.03, $p = .001$). In the misattribution condition, participants in the trivialization-first condition seemed to be more likely to volunteer (11/20) than were participants in the behavior change-first condition (6/20, chi-square (1) = 2.56, $p = .10$), although the difference was only marginally significant.

TRIVIALIZATION

A 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run on the trivialization measure. The independent variables were the order of the two modes of reduction (trivialization-first versus behavior change-first) and the misattribution (versus no misattribution). Furthermore, we performed post hoc comparisons with Fischer's Least Significant Difference Test (LSD), measuring the effect of misattribution in the trivialization-first and behavior change-first conditions and measuring the effect of order in the no misattribution and misattribution conditions.

There was no effect of misattribution on trivialization ($F(1, 76) = .54$, *ns*); there also was no effect of order ($F(1, 76) = .06$, *ns*). The misattribution x order interaction was significant ($F(1, 76) = 11.84$, $p < .000$).

Post hoc comparisons (LSD test) measuring the effect of misattribution on the trivialization-first condition revealed that participants in the trivialization-first condition trivialized more when they were in a no misattribution context ($M = 9.85$), than did participants in a misattribution context ($M = 7.10$, $p = .05$). On the contrary, in the behavior change-first condition, participants in a no misattribution context ($M = 6.6$) trivialized less than did participants in a misattribution context ($M = 10.85$, $p = .004$).

Moreover, post hoc comparisons measuring the effect of order in the no misattribution condition revealed that participants in the trivialization-first condition trivialized more ($M = 9.85$) than did those in the behavior change-first condition ($M = 6.6$, $p = .02$). Conversely, in the misattribution condition, participants in the behavior change-first condition ($M = 10.85$) trivialized more than did those in the trivialization-first condition ($M = 7.10$, $p = .01$).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

As we hypothesized, when behavior change was made available first, the results were consistent with those obtained by Fried and Aronson (1995): participants were less inclined to volunteer in a misattribution situation than in a no misattribution situation. Hence, the effect of misattribution was observed once more. One can conclude that misattribution is an efficient mode of dissonance reduction.

However, when behavior change was made available second (that is, in the trivialization-first condition), the misattribution effect backfires. In such a situation, participants in misattribution conditions were more inclined to volunteer than were participants in the no misattribution condition.

A similar pattern of results was observed on the measure of trivialization. More specifically, we observed an effect of misattribution in the trivialization-first condition. Once again, trivialization did not occur as frequently in the misattribution condition as in the no misattribution condition. One possible conclusion could be that misattribution inhibits trivialization as well as inhibiting attitude change in the forced-compliance paradigm (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). This effect of misattribution on trivialization was observed only when trivialization was made available first. When it was presented second (i.e., behavior change-first condition), participants trivialized more in the misattribution condition than in the no misattribution condition.

Results on behavior change and trivialization suggest that misattribution inhibits the procedures of reduction regardless of which mode of reduction is presented first.

Finally, our results are not easily compatible with the misattribution theorists' point of view: misattribution is an alternative mode of dissonance reduction. In other words, an external attribution (e.g., misattribution) of the internal aversive state (e.g., dissonance) can resolve or reduce this psychological tension. If dissonance is actually reduced by misattribution, tension is reduced, and does not need to be reduced once again by an alternative mode (i.e., the mode of reduction made available second). The results obtained here in the misattribution context on the mode of reduction presented second are inconsistent with this interpretation.

In other words, the misattribution effect no longer occurred when considering the modes of reduction made available second. These results are consistent with previous research on the alternative nature of the modes of dissonance reduction (Gosling et al., 2006; Gotz-Marchand, Gotz, & Irle, 1974; Michel & Fointiat, 2002). Taken together, our results support the hypothesis of the complementary model of dissonance reduction (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994), rather than an exclusive model of dissonance reduction.

On the other hand, one can argue that the results we found in the misattribution conditions are somewhat compatible with a consistency explanation. In that case, misattribution provides a way to reduce dissonance. When the behavior change is provided first, there is no need to change the behavior since dissonance is already reduced. When given the opportunity to assess whether the issue is important (or trivial), not surprisingly, participants state that the issue is trivial, simply because they want to be consistent with their behavior. Conversely, when the opportunity to trivialize is made available first, participants are likely to indicate that the issue of respecting the speed limits is important, simply because they advocate that position. So when a behavior change opportunity is given, they are likely to change their behavior because of the need to be consistent with the stand they took when reporting the importance of the issue.

If consistency between the two routes to dissonance reduction was a plausible interpretation of the results found here, participants who agreed to volunteer (whatever the context of misattribution or no misattribution) should view the topic of speed limits as less trivial than would participants who refused to volunteer. It was not the case: no significant difference was observed between participants who agreed to volunteer ($M = 8.43$) and participants who refused to volunteer ($M = 8.31$). Moreover, in the behavior change-first conditions, participants who agreed to volunteer in a misattribution context ($M = 13.5$), assessed the speed limits as less important than did participants who volunteered in a no misattribution context ($M = 6.26$, $F(1, 76) = 9.67$, $p < .003$). Consistency cannot easily account for these results.

It is our view that even if misattribution is a route of dissonance reduction, it does not constitute an efficient and permanent route. Thus, we suggest that the presentation of the second mode of reduction reactivates the nonreduced tension (Martinie & Joule, 2000). In other words, misattribution could represent a momentary solution to the psychological tension, involving a kind of “don’t remind me effect” (Elkin & Leippe, 1986). This question could be examined in further research, including, for instance, a measure of effect (Elliot & Devine, 1994).

REFERENCES

- Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. McGuire, T. Newcomb, M. Rosenberg, & P. Tannenbaum (Eds.), *Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook* (pp. 5-27). Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Aronson, E. (1999). Dissonance hypocrisy and the self-concept. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), *Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology* (pp. 103-126). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Aronson, E., Fried, C. B., & Stone, J. (1991). Overcoming denial and increasing the intention to use condoms through the induction of hypocrisy. *American Journal of Public Health*, **81**, 1636-1638.

- Beauvois, J. L., & Joule, R.-V. (1999). A radical point of view on dissonance theory. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), *Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology* (pp. 43-70). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Dickerson, C., Thibodeau, R., Aronson, E., & Miller, D. (1992). Using cognitive dissonance to encourage water conservation. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, **22**, 841-854.
- Elkin, R. A., & Leippe, M. R. (1986). Physiological arousal, dissonance, and attitude change: Evidence for a dissonance-arousal link and a "Don't remind me" effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **51**(1), 55-65.
- Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **67**(3), 382-394.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, **59**, 203-210.
- Fointiat, V. (1996). Rationalisation cognitive versus rationalisation en acte dans le paradigme de la fausse attribution de l'éveil de la dissonance [Cognitive rationalization versus act rationalization in a misattribution situation of cognitive dissonance]. *Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale*, **30**, 10-21.
- Fointiat, V. (2004). I know what I have to do, but...: When hypocrisy leads to behavioral change. *Social Behavior and Personality: An international journal*, **32**(8), 741-746.
- Fointiat, V., Morisot, V., & Pakuszewski, M. (2008). Effects of past transgressions in an induced hypocrisy paradigm. *Psychological Reports*, **103**(2), 625-633.
- Fried, C. B., & Aronson, E. (1995). Hypocrisy, misattribution, and dissonance reduction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, **21**(9), 925-933.
- Gosling, P., Denizeau, M., & Oberlé, D. (2006). Denial of responsibility: A new mode of dissonance reduction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **90**(5), 722-733.
- Gotz-Marchand, B., Gotz, J., & Irlé, M. (1974). Preference of dissonance reduction modes as a function of their order, familiarity, and reversibility. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, **4**(2), 201-228.
- Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (1999). *Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Joule, R.-V. (1991). Double forced compliance: A new paradigm in cognitive dissonance theory. *Journal of Social Psychology*, **131**, 839-845.
- Leippe, M. R., & Eisenstadt, D. (1994). Generalization of dissonance reduction: Decreasing prejudice through induced compliance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **67**(3), 395-413.
- Martinie, M.-A. (2003). Spontaneous use of dissonance reduction mode in a forced compliance situation. *New Review of Social Psychology*, **2**, 237-243.
- Martinie, M.-A., & Joule, R.-V. (2000). Trivialisation et rationalisation en acte dans le paradigme de la fausse attribution: Deux voies alternatives de réduction de la dissonance [Trivialization and rationalization acts in a false attribution paradigm: Two alternative modes for reducing dissonance]. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*, **13**(2), 93-114.
- McKimmie, B. M., Terry, D. J., Hoog, M. A., Manstead, A. S. R., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2003). I'm a hypocrite but so is everyone else: Group support and the reduction of cognitive dissonance. *Group Dynamics: Theory, research, and practice*, **7**, 214-224.
- Michel, S., & Fointiat, V. (2002). Trivialisation versus rationalisation cognitive: Quand l'adhésion à la norme de constance guide le choix du mode de réduction de la dissonance [Trivialization versus cognitive rationalization: When adherence to the norm of consistency guides the choice of mode of reduction of dissonance]. *Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale*, **56**, 58-63.
- Simon, L., Greenberg, J., & Brehm, J. (1995). Trivialization: The forgotten mode of dissonance reduction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **68**(2), 247-260.

- Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37*(3), 228-243.
- Stone, J., Aronson, E., Crain, A. L., Winslow, M. P., & Fried, C. B. (1994). Inducing hypocrisy as a means of encouraging young adults to use condoms. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20*(1), 116-128.
- Stone, J., Wiegard, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72*(1), 54-65.
- Stults, D. M., Messé, L. A., & Kerr, N. L. (1984). Belief discrepant behavior and the bogus pipeline: Impression management or arousal attribution. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20*(1), 47-54.
- Thibodeau, R., & Aronson, E. (1992). Taking a closer look: Reasserting the role of the self-concept in dissonance theory. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18*(5), 591-602.
- Zanna, M. P., & Cooper, J. (1976). Dissonance and the attribution process. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), *New directions in attribution research* (Vol. 1). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

individual use only

Copyright of Social Behavior & Personality: An International Journal is the property of Society for Personality Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

individual use only